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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
As we move into the 1980s, two seemingly incongruous trends in regulation are
apparent. First, the remarkable growth in regulation, particularly in the social and
environmental areas, has led to unprecedented levels of federal intervention in the
economy. Second, and as yet less significant in its total impact, there exists a
counter-trend of deregulation, particularly in many areas of direct economic
regulation. Analysis of these trends falls within the political field and outside the
traditional expertise of economists studying regulation. Nonetheless, natural ques-
tions arise: How are these trends to be accounted for? While we have reasonably
good models predicting the behavior of firms given different regulatory constraints
and changing regulations, we have little systematic analysis that allows similar
understanding of political events of direct relevance to the concerns in the
literature.1 For example, why have certain regulatory arenas been relatively stable
over the past few decades only to go through major changes in recent years? Why
did deregulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) occur in 1978 and not
1968? Why has one side of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
(common carrier regulation) promoted competition with regulated industries for
over a decade while the other side (over-the-air broadcasting) hindered competition
for nearly twenty years? More generally, where is deregulation most likely to occur
or likely to be successful? Finally, what is the role of economic analysis in these
events?
These are some of the issues relevant to economic analysis of regulation, yet
economists have no framework to address these concerns. Both popular and
scholarly discussions of regulatory policy-making focus on the agency as the
source of political decisions without a broader view of the role of the agency
within the political system. Popular characterizations of agency policy usually
consider agency decisions in terms of a "runaway bureaucracy" working for its own
interests rather than those of the public. Similarly, in the scholarly literature, both
economists and political scientists studying regulatory policy-making typically em-
ploy research strategies that focus on an agency. For example, "What are the
economic effects of regulation by the CAB or the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) ?'2
1. Many scholars have contributed to this area by raising the appropriate concerns and attempting
to explain them. Nonetheless, no body of theory exists that may be used to address these concerns. See
generally, L. DAVIS & D. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971);
R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971) [hereinafter cited as REFORMING REGULATION]; B. OWEN & R.
BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS [hereinafter cited
as OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM]; Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Pro-
cess of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. L. & ECoN. 291, 294-327 (1974); Peltzman, Toward a
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L.& ECON. 211 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Peltzman]; Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); P. Aranson, The Uncertain Search
for Regulatory Reform, 1979 (Working Paper No. 79, Law and Economics Center, University of
Miami); and R. Noll, What is Regulation?, 1979 (Mimeo from California Institute of Technology)
[hereinafter cited as What is Regulation?]. Relevant works from political science literature include:
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); T. Lowi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM (2nd ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as LowI]; and J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
(1980-)\[hereinafter cited as WILSON].
2. See What is Regulation?, supra note 1, regarding the narrow focus of most studies of regulatory
policy.
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Peltzman, in his search for an understanding of why regulation might benefit
organized industry groups instead of consumers, moves away from a simple agency
focus to a broader look at the political system. 3 His approach incorporates a vote-
maximizing politician called the "regulator." The model rests on a contrast between
producers and consumers. Peltzman argues that because more concentrated pro-
ducers have both lower organization costs and higher individual stakes in regulatory
policy, they provide greater political support to the regulator. Hence policy benefits
flow disproportionately (though not exclusively) to the producers at the expense of
the consumers. This important contribution helps explain one set of regulatory
circumstances.
The limitations with Peltzman's analysis in dealing with the issues raised above
are threefold: First, the model seems more applicable to the industry-specific
regulation (CAB, ICC, FCC) and the influence of concentrated interest groups and
less suited to industry-wide regulation (OSHA, CPSC, EPA) and the influence of
more diffuse groups such as labor, consumerists or the environmentalists. Second,
the model is incomplete even for industry-specific agencies: deregulation has
significantly altered these agencies in a manner not explained by the model. Third,
the simple political actor has no real world counterpart in our political system.
Our inability to understand the major transformations of various regulatory
arenas over the last decade provides the motivation for this article. The model
developed below presents an equilibrium theory of regulatory policy-making that
focuses on the conditions that foster stability on the one hand, and those that
stimulate change on the other. Part I develops the first task in three stages. First, it
presents a general discussion of the relationships between agencies, interest groups,
and politicans; second, the model presented reveals the logic underpinning an
equilibrium policy choice; and finally, the implications of this abstract model are
developed for agency policy-making. Part II extends the model to explore the
factors involved in policy change. This is done by using the model to predict the
effect of certain changes in independent variables and then applying these predic-
tions to three case studies: deregulation of the CAB, a contrast between the FCC's
fostering of competition in telephone regulation and protection of the status quo
for broadcast regulation; and third, the nature of the influence of the environmen-
talists in nuclear power.
I
A MODEL OF REGULATORY POLICY EQUILIBRIUM
A wide variety of political actors with diverse goals interact to make policy.
These include Congress (especially members of the key committees), the president,
the courts, interest groups, and of course, the agencies themselves. Each plays a
specialized role; understanding final policy outcomes requires understanding the
influence of each political actor. The main argument of this Section can be
summarized succinctly. Agency policy equilibrium results from combinations of
3. Peltzman, supra note 1.
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three factors: low or intermittent presidential interest; clear court precedents with
little expectation of change; and stable patterns in public opinion and the relative
balance of interest groups.
For most agencies, the influence of the president is sporadic or unimportant;
and while courts are an ever-present constraint in the form of procedure, most
agencies do not experience interventionist judicial behavior or regularly changing
precedents. To the degree that agency policy remains stable, therefore, it reflects
an equilibrium derived from the behavior and strategic choices of Congress,
interest groups and agencies.
A. Congress, Interest Groups, and Regulatory Agencies
In order to model outcomes of the interaction among these players, we need
first to examine the political institutions that provide them with opportunities for
cooperation and mutual exploitation.
1. Congressional Structure and Policy-making
Committees and subcommittees dominate the policy-making process. These
institutions limit the political choice possibilities, and thus play a crucial role in
determining the political allocation of resources.4 Two features of these institutions
mold policy choice. First, the committee system divides the legislative responsibili-
ties into separate policy jurisdictions. Within its policy area, a committee and its members
wield a disproportionate influence over policy. This includes a number of special powers
such as control over proposals for new legislation and for agency policy oversight.
Second, committee membership is primarily a self-selection mechanism.5 Congressmen
typically gain influence over policy of direct interest to their district. Because of
their differential influence over policy in a given area, these members exploit their
greater influence over the fate of relevant interest groups in return for electoral
support.
This division of policy areas provides the foundation for the policy-making
process. The fragmentation of policy issues into separate jurisdictions lumps a
small number of interest groups, congressmen, and agencies together. These three
sets of actors have divergent but compatible goals. Interest groups seek the benefits
of legislation and policy-making. 6 For example, firms seek benefits in a variety of
4. This Section draws on the major works in political science on Congress and policy-making,
particularly those relying on the rational choice approach. Notable research includes: R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN
IN COMMITTEES (1973) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES]; R. FENNO, HOME STYLE (1978);
M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); M. FIORINA, REPRESENTA-
TIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES (1974) [hereinafter cited as REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND
CONSTITUENCIES]; Lowi, supra note 1; and MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) [here-
inafter cited as MAYHEW].
5. Freshman legislators are appointed to one of their first three choices (out of twenty-two) over 80
percent of the time. Returning congressmen seeking to switch committees do even better. Finally, when
combined with those congressmen who remain on the same committee, the average frequency of landing
on the first, second, or third choice approaches one. See K. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE (1978).
6. Interest groups include a wide range of collective behavior. Following Fiorina, "We use the term
group' as a kind of shorthand for the opinion sectors into which the representative divides the district; no
false personification is implied. A group may be a well-defined formal entity, such as COPE or the Possum
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forms, ranging from minor improvements in their rights under the status quo to
full cartelization. Similarly, single issue groups such as the civil rights advocates, the
environmentalists, war veterans, or the National Rifle Association (NRA) seek to
further their own interests and policy goals. Agencies are simply one vehicle for
this purpose.
Congressmen seek reelection and career advancement. This implies that they
bend with the wind of public opinion in general, and further the interests of
attentive and politically active interest groups in particular. Often, this entails that a
particular congressman becomes identified with a specific policy area. While Con-
gress as a whole may have little interest in an agency, this congressman, by virtue
of his committee power may wield an enormous influence. Examples of prominent
congressmen associated with a particular area come to mind readily: Senator
Cannon on aviation and transportation policy; Senator Pastore on broadcast regula-
tion; Congressman Price on atomic energy; Senator Kennedy on health; Senator
Long (and until recently, Congressman Mills) on tax policy; and finally, Senator
Muskie (until recently) on environmental policy. These congressmen, from their
key committee positions, pursue their electoral goals and policy initiatives through
exploitation of the relevant interest groups and of public opinion. The greater the
potential rewards, the more ripe it is for new policy initiatives.
Often, agencies are the vehicle for this endeavor. Agency heads and commission
members, anxious to further their careers and goals of power and prestige
(including large budgets) as well as completing their own pet projects and policy
initiatives, depend upon service to interest groups and key committee members for
their success.
In a real sense, the goals of these three sets of players are compatible.
Congressmen, seeking reelection and national prominence, further the interests of
new and established groups. Agencies aid powerful politicians--generally congressmen
on relevant committees, though presidents are important at times--by implementing
policies beneficial to constituent groups relevant for a particular policy area.
Finally, the interest groups reward politicians through aiding reelection. This
advances Congressional careers and helps the potential success of policy initiatives,
a key to national prominence.
2. Congressional Control of Agencies
The relationship between a committee and an agency within its policy jurisdic-
tion is widely misunderstood. Most observers take the absence of regular congres-
sional hearings, investigations, and legislation to signal a lack of interest or control. 7
Hollow Rod and Gun Club, a demographic segment of the constituency such as Catholics or Blacks, or an
'issue public' such as pro-prayer in schools." REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES, supra
note 4, at 31.
7. For example, see L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); and K.
CLARKSON & T. MURIS, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION, 1979 (Working
Paper No. 79-5, Law and Economics Center, University of Miami). For a fuller development of the thesis
presented in this paper, see R. Calvert and B. Weingast, Six Myths of Regulation: Congress, the
Bureacracy, and Regulatory Reform, 1980 (mimeo from Center for the Study of American Business,
Washington University).
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However, committees fail to undertake these easily observed and resource intensive
techniques of official oversight because more subtle and less expensive techniques
serve the same function.
Congressional influence over agency decisions does not proceed by considered,
public deliberations that result in a clear resolution of policy issues. Rather, agency
control and "oversight" tends to occur through the informal, indirect and ex parte.
This includes a variety of techniques from the budgetary process. Earmarking of
funds, forbidding expenditures for particular purposes or programs, as well as
control over size of budget, personnel, and other prestige items such as personal
perquisites are all used regularly. As Wildavsky argues, the agencies most success-
ful in this process are those that serve congressional clienteles.8 Additionally, other
more subtle techniques are available. For example, a source of influence of great
potential but generally of low visibility is the appointment process. Regulatory
commissioners owe their appointments (and reappointment possibilities) to Con-
gress. The evidence suggests that except during unusual times in which the
president includes this policy area in his personal political program, this influence
is left to Congress. As with the budgetary process, this power is exercised on behalf
of congressional constituents.
9
Finally, hearings and investigations are used to influence decisions and stymie
unwanted policy initiatives by uncooperative agency members (with potentially
negative consequences for careers). The incentives provided by the threat of
large-scale intervention may be the most important consequence of sporadic, but
carefully targeted, congressional investigations. Consequently, agencies undertake
few policy initiatives without informal congressional consent. 10
8. Wildavsky stresses that an agency must cultivate a clientele. In particular, to be successful, he
advises agencies to "serve your clientele," "expand your clientele," "secure congressional and clientele
feedback," and "concentrate on individual constituencies" (i.e., be specific about which groups benefit
from particular programs or potential changes in policy). A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS 65-69 (1974).
9. Referring to industry-specific regulation, Noll argues "In theory, regulatory commissions are
composed of neutral, objective experts on the affairs of the regulated industry, and on the public interest
in the behavior of the regulated. In practice, appointees to commissions must have the tacit approval of
the regulated industries. Appointments, almost unnoticed by the general public, are closely watched by
regulated firms. Rarely does the President appoint and the Senate confirm a commissioner if the
regulated industry is politically aligned against him. While the appointments process does not necessarily
produce commissioners who are consciously controlled by the industry they regulate, it nearly always
succeeds in excluding persons who are regarded as opposed to the interest of the regulated." REFORMING
REGULATION, supra note 1, at 43. While Noll's discussion focuses on industry-specific regulatory agencies
and regulated firms, one could substitute "congressional constituency" in this passage and have an apt
characterization of nearly all regulatory agencies. Moreover, a recent study undertaken by the Senate
Commerce Committee confirms this conclusion. "In an investigation of all appointments to the FCC and
the FTC during the twenty-five year period, 1949-74, Congress played a major role in the appointment of
particular members; in nearly half, congressional sponsorship was the sole motivation for the appointment."
See COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., APPOINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (Comm.
Print 1976).
10. As Noll observes, "... in no meaningful sense is regulation independent, especially of Congress."
Moreover, " [a]lthough the president could exercise authority over regulatory agencies, there is little
evidence that he or his administration makes much of an attempt to do so." REFORMING. REGULATION, supra
note 1, at 34, 36. For other studies on congressional-agency relations drawing similar conclusions, see W.
CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS (1969) [hereinafter
cited as KOHLMEIER]; E. KRASNOW AND L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (2nd ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as KRASNOW AND LONGLEY].
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Notice the implications of these incentives in perfect operation. First, if agencies
follow their cues and congressional guidance, we would observe little ostensible
committee attention. No resources need be devoted to a policy area functioning
properly; rather, hearings and legislation are invested in those areas not functioning
smoothly. Second, the appropriate congressional clientele relationships are
maintained-indeed, some agencies may appear captured by their clientele. And
finally, congressmen may appear ignorant of policy and agency proceedings. This
stems from the fact that congressmen judge the success of agency decisions based
on constituency reaction, and not through detailed, systematic study and oversight.
3. Conclusion
Because the interests of the committee with policy jurisdiction, the agency, and
the relevant interests groups are compatible, they form an integral and partially
autonomous political unit for mutual gain. This tripartite set of actors will be
labeled subgovernments in the following discussion, though various other terms are
used in the political science and popular literatures, such as, "cozy legislative
triangles," and "iron triangles.""I As Part II shall demonstrate, subgovernments are
not immutable, iron triangles. In fact, policy-making is subject to a variety of
outside forces from which the three principal parties are only partially insulated.
Interest groups wield influence over a particular area because the committee
and subcommittee structure of Congress roughly parallels the important groups.
By partially isolating the politically important groups into different political arenas,
this structure allows each set of interests to have disproportionate influence in one
area.
B. The Model
The subgovernment structure of policy-making, repeated across diverse areas,
implies that congressmen are typically very powerful within their policy domain,
but have little influence outside this area. The preceding discussion provided the
foundation for the following assumptions. First, public opinion and the active
interest groups determine the preferences of congressmen, and second, congressmen
control agencies. To understand policy decisions, therefore, we turn to an analysis
of congressional institutions to understand the opportunities available to committee
members to serve their clientele. This Section provides an analytical model of the
operation of subgovernments using modern social choice theory. This allows the
notion of the "increased influence" of key committee members to be modeled more
precisely.
11. The literature on policy subgovernments is quite extensive, though most contain descriptive
analysis rather than theoretical development. See D. CATER, POWER IN WASIIIN- ON (1964): ]. FREEIAN,
THE POLITICAL PROCESS: EXECUTIVE BUREAU-LEGISLAT[ VE COMMII-FEE RELATIONS (rev. ed 1965): R.
Davidson, Breaking Up Those Cozy Triangles: An Impossible Dream?, Symposium on Legislative
Reform and Public Policy (1976). Finally, the influence of Lowi will be found throughout this essay,
particularly regarding the policy consequences. See Lowvi. siupra note 1.
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1. Social Choice Models of Voting
Modern social choice theory is an approach to modeling voting procedures.' 2
Typically, the focus has been on simple majority rule. A major question guiding
this literature concerns the existence of equilibrium. For a set of policy alternatives,
say A, B, C, .... Z, where a set of voters is to choose among these, a global
equilibrium for majority rule is an alternative that commands a majority against all
other alternatives. If a global equilibrium exists, then policy choice can be both
predictable and stable. Any other policy alternative is unstable since the equilibri-
um is preferred to this alternative by a majority. Moreover, once the equilibrium is
selected, no policy can replace it.
Social choice theorists have investigated the likelihood that such equilibria exist.
The basic results show that, in general, no equilibrium exists for majority rule. 13
Rather, for any particular policy alternative, there exists some other alternative that
commands the support of a majority against it.
Cycles of the following type exist: alternative A beats B; B beats C; but C beats
A. McKelvey has shown that these cycles are pervasive, extending over the entire
policy space. t4 This implies that as long as new proposals can be made, majority
rule choice has no natural stopping point.
As social choice theorists point out, this extreme sort of instability in majority
rule voting means that final policy selection depends upon seemingly arbitrary
considerations such as the order in which the alternatives arise for comparison
(hereinafter called the "agenda"). 15 This conclusion can be stated in another more
useful manner: for any set of voter preferences over policies, the existence of
policy cycles implies that any point may be the final policy choice of the appropri-
ately chosen agenda.
The agenda, therefore, plays a crucial role in policy choice. Those with the
power to manipulate the agenda gain considerable influence over final policy
choice. Moreover, to the degree that the rules of policy choice institutionalize
agenda control in a well-defined manner, the influence of the agenda will be
non-random and subject to analysis. Pursuing this line, social choice theorists have
recently turned their attention from simple majority rule institutions to the study
of more complex institutions with specific rules governing agenda control. 16 One of
the main themes of this research is the role played by institutions in the creation of
12. See Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory, 20 AM. J. POLITICAL Sc.i. 511 (1976).
13. See Cohen, Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models, 20 J. EcoN. THEORY 1 (1979);
McKelvey, General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Models of Voting, 47 EcONOmi" IRICA
108 (1975) [hereinafter cited as McKelvey]; Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority
Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1967).
14. See McKelvey, supra note 13.
15. On the strategic use of the agenda, see Plott & Levine, A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee
Decisions, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 146 (1978).
16. See Shepsle, The Role of Institutional Structure in the Creation of Policy Equilibrium, in PU BUC POLICY AND
PUBLIC CHOICE (D. Rae & T. Eismeier eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Role of Institutional Structure];
Kramer, Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces, 2 J. MATH SoC. 165 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Kramer]; Romer & Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,
33 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978); and Shepsle, Institutional ArrangemenLs and Equilibrium in Multidimensional
Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Institutional Arrangements and
Equilibrium].
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stable policy choice. Institutions may induce a determinant social choice by restricting
the types of policy comparisons that can arise for a vote by the entire body.
2. Assumptions of the Model
An important feature of the congressional committee system is that it serves this
function precisely. To see how this works, consider a representative legislature with
n members. Each member is the elected representative of a given, geographically-
based district. Representatives are assumed to maximize the probability of reelec-
tion based on their influence over legislative policy decisions on behalf of their
constituents.
Throughout the following, legislators are simply assumed to rationally calculate
the likely effects of various actions (e.g., voting decisions, introduction of legisla-
tion, or agenda control) upon their reelection chances. That is, each legislator has
an electorally-induced set of preferences over the policies.' 7 Three aspects of the
induced preference relations should be noted. (1) Legislators pursue benefits
primarily for their particular reelection constituency in their district. Since only the
latter bear significantly on their electoral fortunes, representatives weigh these
effects more heavily than those borne by other constituencies. (2) Because different
geographic areas typically have different constituency interests, representatives'
preferences differ systematically across districts. (3) Finally, changes in the political
issues and the types of policies that generate votes change the induced preferences.
Representatives pursue their reelection goals within the confines of the leglislative
rules which may be described as follows. The set of legislators is divided into
subsets called committees. Each legislator is a member of a particular committee.
Associated with each committee is a subset of the policies called its policy jurisdiction.
Committees play key roles in legislative policy choice within their jurisdiction. The
legislature delegates each committee two sets of powers. First, committees are
0granted agenda power within their jurisdiction; any change in the status quo, x° ,
must be proposed by the committee.' 8 Agenda power also conveys veto power to
the committee since any change in the status quo not desired by the committee will
not be proposed by the committee. Second, the committee system delegates
committees oversight authority to control and manage existing programs and
agencies within their respective jurisdictions. Here, the strategic problem of the
17. The conclusions concerning the relationship of a representative's electorially induced preferences
and his constituency interests are developed further in B. Weingast, Congress and Regulation: A Social
Choice Theory of Political Intervention, 1980 (mimeo from Center for the Study of American Business,
Washington University). See also REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS AND CONST ITUENCIES, supra note 4.
18. A notable absence from this formulation is the possibilities of amendments of committee
proposals. It can be shown that with a completely open rule, that is, no restrictions on amendments that
may be proposed, then the situation is precisely analogous to pure majority rule with no equilibrium. See
Role of Institutional Structure, supra note 16. However, the so-called open rule employed in Congress
involves a significant number of restrictions placing it somewhere between a completely open rule and the
closed rule (no amendments). While it remains an open question as to how strong an assumption this is,
the following observation suggests that it is reasonable: the frequency of passage of committee legislation
is over 90 percent under the "open rule," see Dyson & Soule, Congressional Committee Behavior on Roll Call
Vote, 14 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 626 (1970).
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committee members is to control agency policy subject to the constraints placed on
agency choice in the original legislation.
19
To summarize, the assumptions of the model are as follows. Representatives
maximize the chances of their reelection based upon the effects upon their
politically active constituencies (Al). For the enactment of new legislation, each
committee gains agenda power within its jurisdiction; new proposals are subject to
majority rule approval (A2). Committees have complete oversight control within
their jurisdictions, subject to legislative and judicial constraints (A3). Finally, com-
mittee assignments are based upon self-selection (A4).
3. Equilbrium Policy Choice
Having described the assumptions of the model of the legislature, we now
derive its implications. The main conclusion is that because the committee system
lodges agenda control with a particular committee, stable choice may result even in
the absence of global equilibrium. To see how this works, consider a particular
committee together with its policy jurisdiction, X. Throughout the following
discussion, the committee will be considered as a unit. As in the case of a dominant
committee (or subcommittee) chairman, a stable, decisive coalition of committee
members is assumed to control committee choice. This allows the presumption of
consistent, joint committee preferences over policy alternatives and avoids cycles
within the committee.2 °
To begin the analysis, let x° (x° EX) be the status quo policy state in this policy
jurisdiction. For any given policy, two sets are important in determining equilibri-
um. First, unless a particular alternative, x, happens to be the ideal policy judged
by the committee, there will be a set of points that the committee prefers to x. Let
S(x) be this set. Second, since global equilibria do not exist in general, any policy
alternative in the policy space has a corresponding set of points, W(x), that
commands a majority of voters against it. For the status quo, this means that W(x ° )
is the set of alternatives that beat x° . To see that these sets differ, notice that W(x)
only requires that a majority of all legislators prefer points in W(x) to x and says
nothing about the preferences of committee members. Similarly, S(x) only requires
that committee members prefer these points to x and requires nothing about the
preferences of all other legislators; hence, these policies may or may not command
a majority against x.
Since only policies in W(x °) beat x° , the committee treats W(x °) as a constraint
set in its effort to secure the best possible policy alternative. An equilibrium of this
19. A restriction imposed on nearly all agencies is the Administrative Procedures Act and the rule of
administrative law that restricts the mechanics of agency operation. Many scholars note the opportunities
provided here for strategic manipulation via the judicial process. See OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 1;
What is Regulation?, supra note 1.
20. Technically, this assumes that the committee choice function is acyclic. This assumption is made
for simplicity. As long as a committee chairman with agenda power exists, then, even though the
committee is subject to the same condition of no global equilibrium choice, the agenda control may be
used by the chairman to induce stable choice. Thus, the problem is really a two-stage recursive process of
agenda control and voting choice (once in committee and once in the legislature). For convenience, one
stage is omitted from analysis.
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legislative committee system is simply an alternative that the committee cannot im-
prove upon. A structure-induced equilibrium is a policy x* such that W(x*)NfS(x*) = ( .
Or, in words, x'is a structure-induced equilibrium if none of the policies that
command a majority against x* (i.e., W(x*)) is preferred by the committee to x*
(i.e., in S(x*)). x* is simply the best the committee can do given the majority rule
constraint set, W(x*). Alternatively, if for some policy, x, S(x) and W(x) overlap
(i.e., S(x)nW(x) + 0], then there exist policy states preferred to x by the committee
that also gain majority approval against x. Hence x cannot be an equilibrium.
It can be shown that structure-induced equilibria exist under the committee
system with agenda control even if no global equilibrium exists.2 ' Given a status
quo, x° , the lack of global equilibrium implies that W(x0 ) is nonempty. However,
none of the alternatives that beat x0 will be submitted for a vote by the legislature
since this outcome assures that the committee will be worse off.
The consequences of this model and the nature of the structure-induced
equilibrium policy choice may be developed using the five-person legislature
depicted in Figure 1. Points on the graph represent policy alternatives in a
two-dimensional policy space. The two policy variables are labeled "subsidy level to
industry x," and "subsidy level to industry y." Legislators have differing prefer-
ences of subsidy levels for x and y. Each legislator is assumed to have a most
preferred policy, called an ideal point that represents the combination of subsidies
Subsidy Level to Industry X
21. The first results of this type were proved in Kramer, supra note 16 and Shepsle, supra note 16. See
Appendix for the relevant formal developments.
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ranked above all others. For simplicity, all legislators are presumed to have circular
indifference curves over the policy space X. This means that points further away
from the ideal point are less preferred than points closer. The ideal points of
legislators are labeled 1 through 5, respectively. No majority rule (i.e., global)
equilibrium exists in this setting. Let x0 be the status quo policy (i.e., status quo level of
subsidy). Then W(x °) is the set of policies that command a majority of votes against
x0 . To find the location of this set, indifference curves for each of the legislators
are drawn through the status quo. A given legislator prefers all points inside his
indifference curve to x° and will therefore vote for these alternatives against x° .
The numbers inside regions indicate which legislators prefer points in this region
to x0 . Any point located inside the indifference curves of three or more legislators
is in W(x°). The entire set, W(x °) is the interior of the diagonal-lined region.
Which point (if any) of W(x0 ) might replace the status quo crucially depends
upon the makeup of the committee jurisdiction. To see this, suppose the commit-
tee with jurisdiction is comprised of a single individual. If legislator 1 gains control,
for example, then x0 remains an equilibrium since no point preferred by 1 to the
status quo is within W(x°). If, on the other hand, 3 gains control, then a large
change in the status quo is made. Since 3's ideal point is contained within W(x0 ), he
may propose, and the legislature will pass this point.
This example illustrates the general results about the nature of structure-
induced equilibrium. Because the legislative rules institutionalize the agenda con-
trol in a fixed nonrandom manner, some point x* may remain a stable legislative
choice. Even though there exists a set of points that command a majority against
x*, as long as the committee prefers x* to all points that beat x*, it remains in
effect. Moreover, the example also shows that W(x °) may allow considerable
latitude in the nature of final policy. It is in this sense that committees gain a
disproportionate influence over policy choice within their jurisdictions and why we
look to committees to understand policy choice in any specific area. Once the
committee makeup is known, then the structure-induced equilibrium is determi-
nant and characterized for any given status quo and corresponding set W(x°).
C. Implications for Regulatory Behavior
Having presented the model of equilibrium policy choice for a committee
system, we now develop the implications for regulatory agency policy making. The
model implies a structure-induced equilibrium policy exists-that is, a stable
policy-for each regulatory agency. The agenda control rules (A2) and the
agency control authority (A3) allow committee members to protect a given policy
equilibrium to the benefit of their constituency or clientele. This process, repeated
across many policy areas, gives rise to the notion of subgovernments described
above.
For a particular policy area, characterizing agency decisions depends upon the
nature of the politically active constituency groups. These groups represent de-
mands for certain types of policies and against others and, therefore, provide the
reward structure for political action. Inactive interests, on the other hand, remain
unrepresented because they do not provide rewards. A second distinction, noted
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above, is that congressmen weigh the interest of their own district more heavily,
ceteris paribus, than those interests outside their constituency.
Recalling that agencies are assumed to be controlled by congressional commit-
tees, the following implications can be derived from these two distinctions. First, if
local constituency interests dominate the committee, these receive the benefits of
regulation, subject to the constraints imposed by the majority rule constraint set.
Thus, the single-policy issue committee-such as agriculture, urban programs,
western land policies-are strongly biased in favor of these locally represented
constituents.
Second, if the issue is not locally important, that is, if the active interests are, by
and large, not from districts represented on the committee, then committee
members look for the greater political return, given the (possibly diverse) set of
interests that follow this issue. Thus, if only one major constituency is politically
responsive on this issue, policy is biased in its favor. Because the politically relevant
interest groups are limited, the lack of political response limits the benefits to the
committee from choosing otherwise, while the negative returns impose costs since
support is potentially lost to opponents. On the other hand, if two constituencies
are active, policy reflects a compromise between these interests. Here again, if some
interests remain inactive, providing little rewards, they remain unrepresented and
hence at best receive no benefits of policy and may well bear some (or most) of the
costs.
Finally, a third implication of this equilibrium is that once clientele relationships
have been established, committee members will attempt to protect them. Status quo
clientele relationships will be given up only when the expected political returns
from severing existing relationships and gaining new ones are higher than the
losses imposed from losing current ones. Thus, if a new constituency begins to
arise, perhaps gaining voice through various politicians (not on the relevant
committee), policy will remain unchanged initially. Attempts by other politicians to
alter policy will be resisted.
The history of the ICC throughout much of this century illustrates each of
these predictions. 22 For the first third of the century, the railroads were the major
active constituency, receiving the benefits of state-imposed cartelization. When, in
the late 1920s, the advent and success of motor transport threatened cartelization,
truckers were brought within the bounds of regulatory control during the depres-
sion in 1934. As the second implication above predicts, this compromise benefitted
the two active groups through the extension of the cartel to include trucks; since
rail regulation remained a low saliency issue throughout most of this period, the
relatively inactive consumer interests remained unrepresented and unrewarded.
During the post-World War II era, until very recently, these remained the
major active interests in surface transportation policy, and therefore the major
22. This summary draws on the wealth of empirical studies on the ICC. For example, P. MAcAvoY,
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965); J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON & C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS
OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES (1959); and MOORE, Deregulation Surface Freight
Transportation, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS (Phillips ed. 1975).
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beneficiaries of regulation.2 3 This state of affairs was by no means natural or
self-maintaining. On several occasions, the congressional committees with jurisdic-
tion were forced to protect this equilibrium from outside influence. First, through-
out the entire period, the appointments process continued to select commissioners
primarily on the basis of their acceptability to regulated industries. 24 This helped
maintain the agency's position in the subgovernment. Second, when the Justice
Department seriously threatened the cartel's legal basis by moving against the ICC
rate bureaus for collusively setting rates, Congress stopped it. In 1948, it passed
the Reed-Bulwinkle Act exempting the ICC from the antitrust laws, thereby
unambiguously preventing the Justice Department from upsetting the status quo
policy equilibrium.
Finally, nearly every president during the postwar period has tested the water
(i.e., assessed the potential political returns from further action) on regulatory
reform in general and transportation policy in particular. Truman, whose adminis-
tration developed the forestalled antitrust action against the ICC, assembled the
first Hoover Commission to study regulatory policy; Eisenhower gathered the
second. Kennedy employed Judge Landis who developed the oft-cited Report on
Regulatory Policy to the President-Elect. Kennedy, unlike his predecessors, further
tested the political climate for further action before abandoning the effort. Nixon
set up the Ash Council; and finally, both Ford and Carter have called for reform
and deregulation. While all were critical of the industry-specific regulatory agen-
cies, none, except Ford and especially Carter, set in motion further action because
most judged the returns too meager. The single most important difference be-
tween the early period of stable policy and the events in the late 1970s leading to
deregulation was the lack of political returns for action: no audience cared about
or favored reform. In the mid and late 1970s, one appeared.
The main implication of the equilibrium theory developed here is that policy
remains stable and beneficial to congressional-agency clientele as long as the
relevant variables of public opinion, balance of power of interest groups, presiden-
tial initiative, and precedential legal decisions are stable. As long as these variables
remain constant, the political rewards from various alternatives remain constant.
Consequently, both congressional electorally-induced preferences and majority rule
constraints set are constant as well, thereby leaving the structure-induced equilibri-
um in effect. Stability in the political reward structure implies that agencies may
appear committed to serving a particular clientele for long periods of time.
While the above summary of the ICC developed the interpretation of the model
for one agency, similar explanations for other agencies and their clientele could
also be pursued. This same process of subgovernment operation is repeated in
different guises throughout many areas such as agriculture, urban, and environmen-
tal policies, public works, defense procurement, and so on. This list could be
23. Minor exceptions to this broad statement include passenger rail service, particularly along the
Eastern seaboard commuter routes.
24. See KOHLMEIER, supra note 10, ch. 5 at 53-68, ch. 7 at 83-104, ch. 11 at 145-51, ch. 12 at 152-59,
and COMMITTEE ON CONGRESS, supra note 9..
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extended almost indefinitely as the number and diverse nature of policy areas and
their relevant clientele is quite extensive.
II
EQUILIBRIUM CHANGE: THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF REGULATORY POLICY
The model developed in Section I characterizes regulatory policy equilibrium
based on stable patterns in the relevant independent variables. However, as these
variables begin to change, regulatory policy may also change to a new equilibrium.
Section II investigates the influence of several types of changes that have thus far
been assumed constant. The variables studied here are: interest group power or
composition; congressional structure; precedental court decisions; the president's
policy program; and the economic analysis of regulatory policy. In each case, the
underlying issue is whether the relevant change of the particular variable manages
to intercede in subgovernment operation.
Three case studies comprise Section II: the recent deregulation of airlines by
the CAB, a contrast between broadcast regulation and telephone regulation by the
FCC, and finally, the nature of the influence of the environmentalists on nuclear
power. The discussion takes the following form. In each case, the effects of the
relevant changes in variables at a relatively abstract level are explored. Then, these
predictions are applied to the particular course of events. These applications are
offered for the understanding of regulatory choice in a political process rather
than as tests of the model.
A. Deregulation of Airlines
Three separate, though mutually reinforcing effects are relevant for deregulation
of airlines: changes in public opinion and active interest groups; the influence of
the president; and the effect of jurisdictional changes in Congress.
1. Changes in Public Opinion and Active Constituents
Interest groups have always played a major role in American politics. Over
time, moreover, the nature and composition of interest groups has changed. As
interest group activity changes, so do the demands upon politicians for various
types of action. Just as in a market where changes in the composition of demand
for a mix of products invokes a supply response, so too does the political system
respond to changes in interest groups. While the model does not account for
changes in the composition of interest groups, it yields considerable insight into the
policy response which subsequently follows.
Most students of the regulatory process have appreciated the significance of
interest groups for regulatory policy. Less well understood, however, have been
the implications of different types of changes in the relative mix of important
interest groups. Examples include a change from one major producer group to
two, somewhat opposed, sets of producers (e.g., trains versus trucks in ICC); or
regulation may pass through a period in which solely producer groups are active to
one in which some nonproducer group intervenes (e.g., the environmentalists
intervention in nuclear power regulation by the AEC).
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Consider a regulatory arena in which producer groups are the sole active
constituents. As such, they are the sole group generating political rewards and,
hence, are the main subgovernment clientele. Suppose that public opinion on this
issue changes so that a large segment of the public (though not necessarily a
majority) now responds politically on this issue. Some enterprising politicians may
see it in their interests to try to respond to this change by calling for changes in
regulatory policy as well as active opposition to the otherwise stable subgovernment.
The crucial political actors, however, are those on the committee with agenda
power over the agency. The rise of political opponents to the current subgovernment
arrangements does not necessarily guarantee a forthcoming policy change. These
opponents must influence the committee. Their avenues are twofold. First, they
raise the political costs for the committee of certain actions to influence and control
agency policy. For example, by actively opposing what would otherwise be an
unopposed and uncontroversial commission appointment, the costs of vetoing
opponents of the current regulatory regime are higher. This is particularly true
when the president and his appointees are allied with the opponents.2 5 Second,
changes in politically active constituents may also change the committee members
electorally induced policy preferences. If the potential rewards from serving the
new constituency outweigh the current rewards from continuing to benefit current
clientele groups, then the key committee members will use their legislative proposal
powers to affect a change given the new payoffs and the majority rule constraint
set. Moreover, the greater the response among new participants, the more likely
policy gains (through compromise or policy reversal) are forthcoming.
2. Presidents (and Other Political Entrepreneurs)
A political entrepreneur is a politician who seeks to change the issues within the
current public debate, and in so doing becomes credited with this effort and with
subsequent policy initiatives. 26 Developing a clientele or support coalition is crucial
to success of this role since this provides the ultimate political rewards. A political
entrepreneur may successfully alter the status quo operation of a subgovernment
agency-clientele relationship under certain circumstances.
2 7
Consider a president undertaking this role. A president's influence over policy
is limited, and like any scarce resource, must be conserved. Therefore, he reserves
this power for his highest priority areas such as new policy initiatives rather than
25. See subsection infra.
26. While a variety of motivations may underly the development of this role, these have similar
consequences for our purposes: ambition for higher office or a place in history, greater success at
building a clientele and maintaining electoral position, or simply the desire to implement some strongly
felt policy position. For the development of the implications of political entrepreneurs, see N. FROHLICH &
J. OPPENHEIMER, MOD. POLITICAL ECON. (1978); Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST
J. POLITICAL SCI. 1 (1969); and Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article,
Vol. I, PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION MAKING (1966) (PuBLIC CHOICE)
27. In what follows, the discussion focuses on the president who is perhaps most easily recognized in
this role. Other figures include prominent members of Congress associated with a particular policy area as
well as major figures outside the public sector (for example, Martin Luther King on civil rights, George
Meany on labor legislation or Ralph Nader on consumer issues).
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intervention in on-going regulatory programs. 28 However, when such an area
becomes a high priority item on a president's agenda, it has specific consequences.
By publicizing an alternative policy position and drawing public attention, he
threatens to raise costs to those seeking to protect the status quo. Particularly when
this move is combined with a change in public opinion or the relative composition
of active interests, it may hinder congressional protection of an equilibrium and
develop pressure for new policies (as discussed above). Congressmen normally veto
entrepreneurial commissioners who seek to implement new policy programs that
upset the current clientele relationships. By bringing the area into the public
forum, the president may increase political costs to committee members exercising
their veto power. This avenue of influence is particularly attractive when a
president may fill several vacancies on a single commission in a short period of
time. By giving a regulatory commission's chairman (and majority) an independent
political base and protector, the president may potentially attenuate the normal
operation of subgovernments and congressional (and agency) protection of status
quo clientele relationships.
Once again, however, it must be emphasized that the president's ability to
engineer these moves is limited. The area must be a high priority item on his
policy agenda. And perhaps more important, there must be an audience or
constituency for success. Without such, the political rewards for the president are
few and his ability to affect the costs of congressional actions is diminished.
3. Jurisdictional Changes
Jurisdictional changes over ongoing programs are relatively rare in the Con-
gress. The last major reorganization of committee jurisdiction, for example, took
place in 1946 when the number of committees fell from 48 to 19. A somewhat less
significant change occurred in 1970 in the House and in 1975 in the Senate. On
occasion, committees are added and jurisdictions reorganized as new issues come
into the political forefront (such as energy issues in our current political era or
consumer and environmental issues over the past two decades).
An even rarer event, however, is for one committee to successfully usurp
jurisdiction over a particular agency or issue from another committee. To consider
the effects of an alteration in committee jurisdiction when it occurs, refer to Figure
2. Let Cj be the committee with jurisdiction over issue X, a one-dimensional policy
space. 29 The ideal points of the five legislators are x1, 2, xmn, 4, and xh respectively.
Presume, for convenience, that the committee members' ideal points are all in the
neighborhood of x1, and that the status quo is x".
28. As examples: For Kennedy this included the programs composing his "New Frontier;" for
Johnson, it was the "Great Society" (in combination with the Vietnam War); for Nixon, it tended to be
foreign policy issues. Interestingly enough, both Ford and Carter have included regulatory issues among
their programs of personal interest.
29. While a simple one-dimensional example is presented, this principle can be generalized to more
complicated, multidimensional jurisdictions.
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FIGURE 2
Median Voter's Utility Function
XL 2 X0  XX 4 xh x
X0 is the Status Quo
W(X0) = (X0, X)
From the analysis described above, it is apparent that x' remains an equilibri-
um. The majority-constraint set, W(x°), is the open interval (x0 ,R).30 On the other
hand, within this range, the committee prefers points further to the left to points
on the right. Since no point to the left of x0 commands a majority, and since the
committee by assumption prefers x° to all points to the right of x0 , x° remains in
effect.
However, it is also apparent that other legislators (in other committees) have
different preferences and stand to gain from some alternation of the status quo.
Suppose that some other committee, Ck ; Cj, attempts to take jurisdiction over
regulatory issue X, and within the relevant range, Ck prefers larger x to smaller x,
and that their ideal point is located at xh. If the change in jurisdiction takes place,
the change in policy is completely predictable. Since the new committee unambiguously
prefers larger x to smaller x within the majority-constraint set, W(x°), it will
propose, and a majority of legislators will vote for, a point just smaller than R.
This point defines the maximum change within the legislative constraints open to
Ck•
Three further points are worth noting briefly. First, because frequent jurisdictional
usurpation would destroy the incentive to specialize on committees, a number of
parliamentary mechanisms in Congress explicitly forbid crossing jurisdiction lines.
Nonetheless, this may still occur under unusual circumstances such as ambiguity or
30. To see this, note that the median voter's point is labeled xm. As indicated on the graph of his
preference function, this point yields the highest utility, and that, moving in either direction, he prefers
all points closer to xm to those further away. Thus, any point between x0 and R commands a majority
against x0 : the median voter prefers any such point (since, as depicted, i is equally preferred by the
median voter to x0); moreover, all voters with ideal points located to the right of the median prefer any
such x. Since the latter comprise half of the voters by definition, a majority prefers R to x ° when the
median is counted.
AGENCY CIAENTI-: RI.'i.A'IONSHIPS
technicalities.3 ' Second, this example suggests the nature of the growth in interven-
tion resulting from the change in committee chairmen from conservative southern
democrats prior to the mid-1960s to the northern, interventionist-minded liberal
democrats since the mid-1960s. Third, any attempt to change jurisdiction would
certainly invoke a strategic response by the original committee to forestall change.
However, an in-depth analysis of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this
paper.
4. Political Transformation of Airline Regulation, 1970-1978
The influence of these three effects combined to foster deregulation of airlines.
In late 1974 and early 1975, Senator Kennedy (D-Mass.) began public investiga-
tions of the practices of the CAB, in part to determine the political support from
further action on this issue. This investigation took place under the auspices of
Kennedy's Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Proce-
dure. While this event served to advocate and draw public attention to an
alternative policy (deregulation), little positive action resulted because Kennedy had
only investigatory powers but no legislative jurisdiction over the CAB. Jurisdiction
over aviation lies with the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Aviation chaired by
Senator Cannon (D-Nev.), a staunch opponent of deregulation at this time. Indeed,
as one observer noted, "Kennedy's CAB reform ideas have been greeted with stony
silence," by the senators with jurisdiction over the CAB.32
By mid-1976, however, Cannon's opposition was no longer complete. Kennedy
had continued popularizing deregulation, including a second set of hearings in late
1975 and the release of a major study in February 1976, with considerable public
impact. President Ford also came out in favor of reform, thereby forming a
bipartisan coalition. More surprising, however, was the move on the part of the
Senate Commerce Subcommittee Chairman, Cannon. While criticizing Kennedy for
encroaching on his subcommittee's jurisdiction, Cannon nontheless began advocat-
ing more competition for the airlines. Reflecting a further shift in early 1977,
Cannon and Kennedy jointly sponsored a measure to deregulate the CAB. By early
1978 the situation continued to move away from the status quo. President Carter
advocated deregulation, appointed several new, enterprising, deregulation-minded
members to the CAB. In the fall of 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation
Act.
What accounted for the change in enthusiasm by Cannon? How did the change
in the long-standing regulatory status quo come about? In order to answer these
questions, consider the subgovernment operation prior to the sequence of events
from 1974-1978, outlined above. The subgovernment had functioned smoothly for
years. The airlines were the major clientele group of the Board. Moreover, as
31. Kennedy's subcommittee had jurisdiction over administrative practices of federal agencies,
allowing jurisdiction over agency procedure but not policy. Thus, Kennedy was able to hold hearings on
CAB policy under the CAB "practices and procedure." However, his lack of policy jurisdiction prevented
him from bringing new legislation to a vote without consent of the Commerce Committee.
32. See Kohlmeier, A Ripe Time for Airline Deregulation, NAT'L J. 1458 (1975).
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predicted by the approach when outside developments threatened to alter the
arrangement in the subgovernment, Cannon, as Aviation Subcommittee Chairman,
moved to protect the status quo. For example, when the Post Office Committee
engineered a transfer in control over award and compensation for airmail trans-
port from the CAB to the postal service as part of the postal reorganization,
Cannon successfully asserted jurisdiction over the issue that forced the objection-
able part of the proposal be removed.33 Cannon's initial response to Kennedy's
action paralleled this earlier move. However, Kennedy managed to maintain
authority for investigation (though not legislation) on the basis of a technicality.3 4
Prior to the rise of deregulation, the major issue centered upon the adequacy of
service to small communities. 35 Restrictions on competition simply were not an
issue. In part, the politics of airline regulation at this time rested on a fundamental
asymmetry. Disruption of service was highly visible and a significant issue while lost
opportunities for fare reductions drew little attention. Since increasing competition
risked greater chances of financial problems and service disruption with little
promise of political reward, it was avoided.
Figure 3a depicts this situation with reference to a single dimension, the degree
of subsidization of service to small communities. While price, route, and entry
decisions had been demonstrated by economists to have a negative impact on
consumer welfare, these were yet to become political issues. The status quo
represents the structure-induced equilibrium based on the current political oppor-
tunities of the committee. The set of policies that beat the status quo is labeled
W(x°). Cannon and the Aviation subcommittee's major concern was adequacy of
service; service to small communities was encouraged within the feasible limits.
Kennedy investigations began at this point, in 1974. The policies initiated in the
previous few years, under the leadership of Nixon appointee, Chairman Timm,
had generated controversy and denouncement by both the airlines and Congress.
Kennedy's efforts gained publicity by uncovering a series of scandals. The public
reaction, however, was more than a reaction to scandal. Unlike previous investiga-
tions of regulatory failure initiated by a series of presidents, the Kennedy hearings
generated a political response, warranting further efforts. In 1975 and 1976,
President Ford aided the cause by calling for reductions in regulation, further
33. For a discussion of this policy issue and its resolution that is compatible with the model of
committee agenda control developed above. See Levine, Regulating Airmail Transportation, 18 J. L. & ECON.
317-59 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Levine].
34. See note 31, supra.
35. Among the many published hearings relating to the adequacy of air service, see Adequacy of Air
Service: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Adequacy of Scheduled Air Service to the Nation's Small
Communities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1970); Adequacy of Northern New England Air Service: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1971); Local Air-Service to Small Communities: Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1972); and Adequacy of
Air-Service in Illinois: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d. Sess.
(1974). See also Levine, supra note 33. The latter also contains a description of the jurisdictional concerns
on this issue that fit precisely within the above formulation.
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FIGURE 3a
CAB: Pre-1974, Single Political Issue,
Service to Small Communities
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FIGURE 3b
CAB 1975-and early 1976, Two Political Issues
popularizing the issue, and appointing a reform-minded chairman, Robeson. 36 A
second set of Kennedy hearings, in late 1975, publicly demonstrated two things.
First, the dissatisfaction with CAB policies was nearly universal (though not
unanimous on the reasons). Nearly all participants criticized the Board, including
the airlines themselves, who were dissatisfied over the recent CAB policies. Second,
it demonstrated that the issue made good press.
In a rare political maneuver around the official committee, Kennedy had
gained the upper hand. The political appeal of the issue as well as Kennedy's
36. While favoring reform, Robeson made no bold policy initiative during his term, though his
advocacy of deregulation near the end of his term before the first set of hearings by Cannon represented
a rare case of an agency head advocating its own abolishment.
37. As two political observers note, "A short time before, Kennedy had been an interloper in aviation
issues. Now, suddenly, through a combination of diligent staff work, manipulation of the press, and sheer
good fortune, Kennedy was the established spokesman on the most important issues that affected airline
industry. Cannon had been neatly circumvented." R. JONSs & P. \VoLE, TiE PRIVA rE WORLD OF CONGRESS
69 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JONES & WOLL.]
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timing and political maneuvering had taken all by surprise. Not only had Kennedy
demonstrated the political rewards inherent from airline decontrol, but he was
reaping them.
In terms of the model developed above, two aspects prompted action by
Cannon. First, Kennedy (and others including Ford) had developed a new relevant
issue and were demonstrating the strong appeal of a radical departure from the
status quo. Without active intervention on the issue, Cannon might have lost
control to Kennedy. Had Kennedy successfully taken over the issue (that is, gained
jurisdiction), major changes would have passed. This is depicted in Figure 3b.
Given the newly relevant political issue of degree of market control added to the
older issues (represented as the unidimensional "subsidy level to small communi-
ties"), the status quo and corresponding majority constraint set are drawn. In early
1976, as the Figure depicts, the Commerce Committee with policy ideal x', still
supported the status quo. Kennedy, depicted at K, supported significant changes to
low subsidy levels combined with decontrol. The evidence suggests that most other
senators were (or became over the next year) somewhat disposed toward decontrol,
but were significantly concerned about service to their states (and/or the effects on
labor groups). 38 Hence, Figure 3b locates the ideal points for three other senators
favoring less control than the status quo, but nearly as much subsidy to small
communities. In the event of a jurisdictional change, Kennedy would optimize over
the majority constraint set, W(x°), by proposing xK which (to replace x0 ) would
pass the Senate.
Cannon, by taking up the issue, forestalled a jurisdictional fight; but the threat,
combined with the new climate of public opinion, forced him to consider reform as
serious issue. This move attempted to diffuse criticism and eclipse Kennedy. In
early 1976, as Cannon began his own set of hearings, he unambiguously de-
nounced decontrol.
Events favoring deregulation continued. Newly elected President Carter advo-
cated reform early in his term. This was followed by a key event, the appointment
by Carter (with the sponsorship of Kennedy) of a strong critic of regulation,
economist Alfred Kahn, to the chairmanship of the Board. As shown above, the
appointment of commissioners not in line with the status quo requires a separate
source of political support, in this case President Carter and Senator Kennedy. In
combination with the heightened publicity in 1977 (as opposed to pre-1974) their
support increased the costs to congressional veto. Without the development of the
new issue and strong support outside existing subgovernment, including presiden-
38. Regarding the preferences of other legislators, see the analysis in Cohen, Airline Deregulation is Not
Yet Cleared for Take-Off, NAT'L J. 1193-5 (1977). She reports that, "the committee's review of the legislation
pushed by Cannon (with Kennedy's support) demonstrate that most senators do not take the time to
review or understand the broad arguments. Rather, they ask just one question: What does it do for my
state? And in doing so, their concern is primarily responsive to local interests-airlines, unions, airport
operators-that would be most directly affected by change."
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tial advocacy and support, Kahn was unlikely to have made it onto the Board, and
protection of the congressional clientele would have continued.39
The new members at the CAB with external political support played a crucial
role in the success of deregulation. By pursuing deregulation within the bounds of
existing legislation, they performed an important "market test" for Congress. Had
the attempt been unsuccessful, Congress would have denounced the Board and
curtailed the decontrol program. But by 1978, hardly anyone was being hurt by
the de facto move to deregulation. Indeed, fares were down and profits were up,
clearly demonstrating that decontrol was not the dangerous, disastrous alternative
that pessimists and protectors of the status quo had predicted. The real success of
Kahn and his colleagues was twofold. First, by inventing a mechanism within
existing laws, they avoided the need for new legislation prior to policy change; and
second, they implemented change in a nondisruptive manner, demonstrating
viability.
Given the nature of the new political issue, the success of the new policies
under Kahn, Cannon approached deregulation with increasing enthusiasm. By the
time the legislation came up for passage, the rewards clearly favored deregulation.
Cannon became identified publicly with a new, publicity generating issue just a few
months before his successful reelection in November 19 7 8 .4 o Note, however, that
had this issue not generated public support (as it had not in the 1950s and 1960s),
and if prominent political figures outside the subgovernment (Presidents Ford and
Carter, and Senator Kennedy) had not vigorously pursued a change in policy, the
subgovernment probably would not have faced radically differing incentives.!"
Congress had the final say in policy choice: had not in 1978 decontrol appeared so
successful, Congress would have undoubtedly instituted a more mild reform
program.
B. Regulation by the FCC
The following discussion contrasts the course of regulation in protecting the
status quo in two different regulatory responsibilities of the FCC, regulation of
over-the-air broadcasters and common carrier regulation of the telephone system."'
39. As Berman notes, "Had the political environment remained hostile to deregulation, as it always
had been before 1974, pro-deregulation individuals almost certainly would have not been appointed to
the agencies and it would have had both less political incentive and less ideological inclination to change
policies." Berman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in WILSON, supra note 1, at 76.
40. For example, Cannon noted upon the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, "I bring to the
Senate today one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the past several decades. Important not so
much by itself, but because it represents one of the only opportunities this body has had in recent years to
vote for less government regulation and for more free enterprise for a major U.S. industry." JONES &
WOLL, supra note 37, at 72.
41. As noted above, the presidential intervention alone probably could not have changed a subgovernment.
A necessary condition for success seems the role of a politically active constituency supporting policy
change with the president merely exploiting the underrepresentation in one area.
42. This summary draws on an extensive literature on the FCC, see R. NOLL, M. PECK &J. MAcGoWAN,
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION (1973); OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM. supra note I at ch. 5 at
121-57, ch. 7 at 195-237; Beson & Crandall; Deregulation of Cable Television. 44:1 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 77 (1981); Coase, Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1959).
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In both cases, the major active political constituencies were the regulated firms. As
such, these formed the relevant clientele group within the subgovernment, receiv-
ing congressional support and protection. In keeping with this, agency policy
initiatives favored these groups.
In both cases, technological developments in the fifties and sixties led to
competiton among regulated firms. As part of a subgovernment, agencies moved to
protect existing arrangements. However, FCC policy differed radically. Competition
fostered from the mid-1960s through the present for the telephone industry while
competition with television broadcasters was stymied. In what follows, one factor
that contributed to the divergence in regulatory paths on the two sides of the FCC
is studied, namely, the influence of the courts. This illustrates how institutions
outside a subgovernment may substantially influence the course of policymaking.
1. Judicial Constraints
Consider the influence of the court system on regulatory agency policy and the
operation of subgovernments. In general, judicial decisions will be interpreted as
constraints and changes in constraints placed on policy choice by agencies. Many
distinct types of influences may alter policy.
4 3
Suppose that a regulatory subgovernment is in operation, with the agency-
clientele relationship on firm ground. Though the agency may seek to benefit its
constituency, it may be restricted from doing so by the courts. For example,
suppose that a new technology or new source of competition for regulated actors
appears. The agency, following its incentives within the subgovernment, may
attempt to establish jurisdiction over the new activity to protect its clientele. The
success of this policy hinges critically upon court tests of jurisdiction and whether
the court upholds or reverses the agency's decision. If the assertion of jurisdiction
is upheld by the courts, then regulatory policy continues to be consistent with
benefiting clientele; if courts overrule this move, new policy may be inconsistent
with the old. Because courts lie outside the operation of subgovernments, their
decisions may shape agency policy equilibrium in a manner that overrides
subgovernment politics.
2. Television Regulation
In the 1950s, cable television was simply a supplement to over-the-air broadcast-
ing of television designed to improve reception in the fringe areas where signals
were weak. The virtue of cable was the provision of clear signals to remote areas.
Throughout the 1950s, the issue remained uncontroversial and the FCC refused to
assert regulatory jurisdiction over cable services.
43. A %ide range of judicial interventions are important for regulation and each has a significant
policy effect. These include judicial redefinition of mandate, judicial activism requiring a specific policy,
and various forms of strategic manipulation by regulated actors, their opponents, or the agency itself to
impose delay or raise costs. For the present, we study only one, judicial ruling on agency assumption of
jurisdiction, and note that the other influences may be studied from a similar, comparative-statics analysis.
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By the 1960s, however, the situation changed radically as cable providers
discovered they could compete with local stations in one market through importa-
tion of signals from another market via cable systems with microwave relays. In
1962, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over microwave relay systems employed by
cable providers. Three years later, in a move to protect the status quo during
1965-66, the FCC imposed a freeze on all cable providers in the 100 largest
television markets, forbidding importation of signals. These actions were chal-
lenged in the courts and were upheld, thereby allowing the assumption of regulatory
authority to protect the status quo."4 Finally, in the early 1970s, a compromise was
arranged between the broadcasters and cable providers, allowing limited growth of
the latter. The important point here is the role played by regulation in delaying
the growth of cable and the inhibition of competition.
The rise of a new technology that eroded the privileged position of regulated
firms illustrates the reaction of a subgovernment to protect the status quo. The key
congressman in broadcast regulation, Senator Pastore, favored protection of the
interests of broadcasters. 4 5 Though Congress gave the FCC no official legislative
guidance, none was needed. The agency reacted by implementing policies highly
favorable to its clientele.
3. Telephone Regulation
In contrast to the protection of the regulatory status quo by inhibiting the
competition from cable TV, the FCC has encouraged competition with the one-
time monopoly provider of telephone service, American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T). Technological developments have lead to two distinct areas of competi-
tion with AT&T. These have followed similar courses: competition in certain long
distance markets from microwave telephone companies, and competition from
alternative providers of various terminal devices. Though both have followed
similar courses, only the latter will be discussed.
In the mid-1950s, the domestic phone service prohibited customers from
utilizing terminal equipment not provided by AT&T. The ostensible rationale for
this restriction was that "foreign attachments" not manufactured and installed by
AT&T could potentially harm the entire system through interference or
incompatability. This rule was challenged in 1955 by Hush-a-Phone, the manufac-
turers of a device attached to the telephone mouthpiece to reduce the amount of
background noise picked up by the phone and transmitted over the line. The FCC
ruled in favor of AT&T, protecting the status quo. As in the case of cable, the
regulatory decision was challenged in the courts, this time with opposite results. In
1956, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the FCC
restriction of competition, ruling that in this case the device did not adversely
affect the phone system. 4 6 The FCC subsequently reversed its policy.
44. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
45. See, e.g., the analysis in KRASNOW & LANGLEY, supra note 10.
46. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Here, the court ruled that
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A decade later, the issue was brought before the FCC again in the landmark
Caterfone decision.4 7 This case concerned the right of individuals to use terminal
devices that allowed phone communication with mobile sources using the Caterfone
device. Again, AT&T opposed the competition. However, in this case, the Commis-
sion found that the device did not adversely affect the phone system. The judicial
precedents in the Hush-a-Phone decision were clear. As Owen and Braeutigam note,
"the Caterfone case reaffirmed the Hush-a-phone principle, allowing entry into the
supply of terminal equipment. '48 This decision insured that the market for termi-
nal devices was open to competition.
The influence of the judicial system, considered a constraint on subgovernment
operation, played a significantly different role in the terminal devices than in
broadcasting. In both cases, the FCC asserted its regulatory authority to protect its
subgovernment clientele. However, the imposition of constraints by the courts
differed radically, upholding the regulation of cable while denying the prohibition
of terminal devices. This single difference in judicial precedent provided the
foundation for radically divergent policies from two sets of similarly motivated
policy decisions by a single agency.
C. Nuclear Power Regulation and the Environmentalists
The agencies studied above involved a major political transformation leading to
deregulation at the CAB and the promotion of competition by the FCC. However,
the model is more general than a theory of deregulation. It also provides an
interpretation of the intervention of one interest group into the on-going
subgovernment dominated by another clientele group. The case of the influence of
the environmentalists over the course of nuclear power provides an instructive
application to explain agency policy change.
Following World War II, the United States embarked on a program of the
peaceful applications of atomic power. The development of a nuclear power
industry with electrical generating facilities was a major component of this pro-
gram. The subsidies doled out by the AEC from 1946 fostered the development of
its own clientele, the nuclear power industries, including vendors, uranium miners,
as well as utilities seeking a cheap source of a power generation.
Two decades later, the deployment of these plants raised considerable contro-
versy. Through this period to the present, the environmentalists sought to curtail
or halt the deployment of nuclear facilities across the country as part of their
broader goals of limiting access to the environment. The discussion that follows
analyzes one small, but significant, piece of this complex regulatory arena, the
delays imposed by the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Beginning in the late 1960s, environmentalists became a regular source of
the restriction was an "unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber's right to reasonably use
his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental." Id. at 269.
47. In the Matter of the Use of the Caterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 420
(1968).
48. OWEN AND BRAEUTI;AM, supra note I at 231.
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intervention in nuclear power license proceedings, attempting to change the
promotional aspect of nuclear power licensing.'U Among the diverse strategies of
influence, including contesting applications at the AEC (after 1974, the NRC) and
strategic use of the courts for delay, was the influence imposed by the environmen-
tal impact statements. Following the Calvert Cliffs5o decision in 1971 in which the
court ruled that NEPA indeed applied to the AEC, environmentalists gained a
small success. According to one study,5 ' the application of NEPA alone increased
the price of nuclear facilities by 10 to 15 percent.52 Since the issue throughout the
1970s regarding nuclear power was the cost escalation, 53 this contributed the trend
away from nuclear power toward other sources of baseline power generation.
While affecting nuclear power remained only part of the motivation for the
enviromentalists' support of NEPA, the nature of its influence can be understood
through the following analysis.
Consider two relevant sets of issue dimensions. X describes those relating to
nuclear power directly, with larger x implying greater rates of nuclear power
promotion by the goverment and the AEC. Second, and arising somewhat later
than the programs concerning the first, Y describes issues relating to environmen-
tal protection. Greater y implies greater environmental protection. Suppose that a
program for nuclear power development began earlier and located at x". In time,
the second issue became relevant. Moreover, suppose that those favoring high
environmental protection also favor low nuclear power, while those promoting
nuclear power care considerably less about environmental protection. Finally,
assume that the frequency of deployment of nuclear facilities is a function of both
environmental protection and nuclear power promotion, where greater X, ceteis
paribus, implies greater rates and where greater Y, ceteris paribus, implies small
rates.
Figure 4 describes the Congressional choice situation with x" as the status quo
representing a high level of nuclear power promotion, but a low level of environ-
mental protection. The preferences of five legislators are drawn with the members
of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee represented to the right and below x", with
the environmentalists in the upper left, and the three other legislators in between.
49. For further study of nuclear power regulation, see I. BuPP ANI.J. DIRIAN, Lie;wii WAT-R: How niDE
NUCLEAR DREAM DISSOLVED (1978) [hereinafter cited as BL'PT & DERIAN]; D. MONTI;OMERY &J. QEUIRK, Cost
Escalation in Nuclear Power, in PERSPEC TIVES ON ENERGY (M. Firebaugh ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
MONTGOMERY & QUIRK]; Cohen, Innovation and Atomic Energy: Niclear Power Regulation 1966-Present,
43:1 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 67 (1979); L. Cohen, Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Regulatory Pro-
cedures, 1979 (mimeo from Harvard University)
50. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971),
51. Direct construction costs of nuclear facilities more than doubled between 1971 and 1973. It is
estimated that roughly 15 percent of this increase resulted from environmental, safety-related changes in
plant design mandated during this period. See Atomic Energy Comm'n., Power Plant Costs: Current
Trends and Sensitivity to Economic Parameters (Washington 1345, 1974); Cohen. Innovation and Atomic
Energy, 43:1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67 (Winter-Spring 1979).
52. See BuPP & DERIAN and MONTGOMERY & QtUIRK. supra note 49.
53. For example, see V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1964); and G. MCCoNNEI.I.,
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACV (1966).
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FIGURE 4
POLICY EQUILIBRIUM IN NUCLEAR POWER
EnvironMefllal Proecliol,
~Atomic Energy
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The shaded set W(x °) depicts the set of policies that beat the status quo. An
interesting variant on the committee problem occurs here: the committee with
jurisdiction over dimension X differs from that in control of dimension Y, even
though both significantly influence the ultimate outcome of a single regulatory
activity.
Specifically, if the environmental protectionists in the upper left (of Figure 4)
have jurisdiction over Y and the nuclear power promoters have jurisdiction over X
then at x° , the nuclear power promoters can make no improvements. However,
those in control of Y can command a majority of votes moving from x° to xN' EPA,
implying both a much greater level of environmental protection and a lower level
of nuclear power deployment.
This example illustrates the same general principle throughout the paper. In
order to affect decisions in a subgovernment, some political relationship therein
must be altered, or circumvented. Here, the environmentalists gain influence not
because they "capture" the AEC; to the contrary, the AEC and its supporters in
Congress, if anything, grow more hostile to these influences. Rather, they gained
influence because of their control over some alternative policy jurisdiction that
significantly influenced the course of decisions chosen within the original
subgovernment.
CONCLUSION
The fragmentation of policymaking by the committee system fosters the devel-
opment of the relatively stable subgovernment alliances between the congressional
committee with policy jurisdiction, the regulatory agency, and the clientele group(s).
Each committee (and especially each subcommittee) controls a small number of
policy issues. Correspondingly, nearly every major politically active group (or set of
groups) is represented on some subcommittee. This fragmentation that parallels
the major groups allows the simultaneous influence of many groups, each over a
small policy domain, in a way not anticipated by Peltzman's model of a single
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political actor. If many different interests had to compete over a single policy
domain, no single interest could dominate. More likely, policy would represent a
balance of these interests based on the relevant political returns generated by each
faction. Policy fragmentation into relatively autonomous subgovernments forestalls
the need for this competition and suggests why policy benefits each within a small
domain.
As we have seen, subgovernments develop stable relationships leading to policy
choice benefiting the relevant interest groups. Each party of the subgovernment
has incentives to participate and maintain these relationships. However, as shown
in Section II, a number of events outside the control of these three parties may
substantially alter the course of policy. Changes in court precedent may radically
redefine policy. Changes in interest groups alter the incentives for politicians and
may therefore result in policy change to reflect the new balance of interest groups.
To conclude, let us return to the seeming incongruity of the trend of deregulation
amid increasing social regulation. In large part, these two trends reflect changes in
the relative composition of interest groups in our society over the last thirty years.
As recently as fifteen years ago, political scientists could subsume the entire range
of active interest groups under three separate and nearly inclusive headings:
business, agriculture, and labor.5 4 Throughout the thirty years following the in-
ception of the New Deal in 1932, interest groups could be fit readily within this
categorization. Since the mid-1960s, however, this has changed. We have witnessed
the rise and prominence of single-issue groups as never before. These include the
environmental, consumer, and civil rights groups, as well as the anti-Vietnam War
protesters, pro- and anti-abortion groups, the tax limitation movement, and so on.
This change has been paralleled by changes in the committee system so that
jurisdictional lines parallel major groups. Similarly, party discipline has declined as
individual congressmen are increasingly identified with an independent policy area.
This structural change has allowed greater influence by these single issue groups in
precisely the manner illustrated above in the AEC environmentalist example.
This process has had two effects. First, it has fostered and supported the new
wave of regulation. The rise of the new interest groups such as the environmental-
ist, the consumerists (and the so-called public interest advocates), the civil rights
activists and the affirmative action groups, have all contributed to a host of new
regulations over the past decades. Second, it has resulted in the decline in political
support for the status quo as the older pattern of interest groups becomes less
relevant. Simply put, new groups are replacing the older groups as congressional
clientele.
One simple example illustrates this process. Ralph Nader and his associates, as
well as Senator Kennedy, couch their arguments against older economic regulation
(e.g., the CAB or professional self-regulation) in a manner similar to an academic
economist.5 5 This is certainly not because they are persuaded by the economic view
54. For a stimulating analysis of the policy consequences of the rise of single issue groups, see M.
Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, 1980 (Working Paper No. 59,
Center for Study of American Business, Washington University).
55. See THE MONOPOLY MAKERS (1971).
Page 147: Winter 198 1]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of the world. The policies they advocate in the safety, health, and consumer areas
demonstrate the divergence in their views from those of economists. Rather, the
empirical and theoretical development by economists is simply the easiest and most
convincing manner to pursue their political goals in the more traditional regulatory
areas. Simply put, the political constituencies of both these political entrepreneurs
favor social regulation while the older order of regulation benefits other interests
from a previous era that are on the political decline. As noted above, both the AEC
and CAB have been affected by this trend. Thus, the two seemingly incongruous
developments of increasing social regulation and simultaneous deregulation of
certain older regulatory areas are really two manifestations of the same underlying
trend, namely the changing basis of interest groups and representation in the
Congress.
APPENDIX
This Appendix presents the formal results on the existence of a structure-
induced equilibrium described in the body of the paper.56 This develops the
precise contexts in which the results hold as well as other aspects of the model only
alluded to in the text.
1. The Model
The basic results of social choice analysis of majority rule show that the
conditions necessary for the existence of an equilibrium policy choice are unlikely
to be met. Let N be the set of legislators, where each legislator, i, has an electorally
induced preference relation, Ri, that is a complete ordering over the policy space X,
an open convex subset of m-dimensional Euclidean space. Let C(x,y) be the
majority rule choice function, defined over pairs of alternatives as follows. x is said
to be the majority rule choice when compared with y, i.e., x = C(x,y), if and only if
IM(x,y)l > IM(y,x)l where M(x,y) = {iENlx Pi Y} where Pi is the ith legislator's
preference relation. A majority rule equilibrium is an x such that x = C(x,y) VyrX. In
general, no equilibrium exists. Rather, for any particular point, there exists a set of
points that command the support of a majority against it. Cycles exist as a result,
and can be shown to extend over the entire policy space.5 7 Moreover, it can be
shown in general that any point in the policy space can be the final result of the
appropriately chosen agenda, or sequence of votes.58
The legislature studied in the paper is not a simple majority rule institution,
however. Rather, legislators pursue their goals within the confines of the legislative
committee system, described as follows. The set of legislators is divided into subsets
called committees, C = {Ci} where Ci is the i th committee. Each legislator is a member
of a particular committee. Committees play key roles in policy choice. Each of the
56. The model summarized in the appendix draws on Institutional Arangements and Equilibrium and
Institutional Structure, supra note 16.
57. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
58. McKelvey, supra note 13.
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m dimensions of the policy space X corresponds to a political issue. The m issues
provide the basis of the policy space are grouped into non-overlapping subsets
called jurisdictions. Let J{JJi be the set of jurisdictions, with ji the ith jurisdiction.
Committees are associated with their jurisdiction according to some fixed
rule, F: --3 J.
Within their jurisdiction, each committee is delegated agenda power. Any
change in the status quo, x° , within its jurisdiction must be proposed by the
committee. This is the major difference between the legislative committee system
and simple majority rule.
2. Equilibrium Choice
Consider a particular committee, Cj, together with its jurisdiction, Ji = F(Cj). Let
Y C X be the subset of the entire policy space falling under j's jurisdiction. The
committee choice function, Cj(x,y) defined over alternatives in X reflects the
preferences of committee members (or a decisive coalition of members) for policy
states. As in the body of the paper, this committee is considered as a unit,
dominated by a stable and decisive coalition. We therefore assume C.(x,y) is
complete and transitive.
Let x 0EF be the status quo policy state. The results on majority rule noted above
imply that for any given jurisdiction, and for any given status quo point, x° , there
exist a set of points, W(x°), that beats the status quo in a majority rule vote. In the
passage of new legislation to replace the status quo, the committee treats W(x °) as a
constraint set, and chooses the best alternative from W(x ° ) U {x0} according to
C(x,y).
We can also show that equilibria exist under these circumstances. Let x = C,(x,y)
Vyr W(x °) U {x°}. If x = x0 , then no change occurs. If x : x0 , then by (A2) the committee
proposes x. Since xEW(x°), then by definition x is passed by majority vote, and x =
C(x,y). To define the equilibrium state, let S(x) be the set of points preferred to x
by the committee. That is, S(x) = {yeXI y=C(x,y)}.
Definition: A structure induced equilibrium is a point
x* s.t. S(x*) n W(x*) = o)
Under these circumstances, a generalization of Shepsle's results may be proved.5 9
THEOREM: If the legislators' preferences may be represented by strictly quasi-
concave, continuous utility functions, and if Cj(x,y) is well-defined,
then structure-induced equilibria exist for the legistative committee
system.
59. Supra note 56.
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